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Bryn Mawr Classical Review 2014.09.43
Veit Rosenberger (ed.), Divination in the Ancient World: Religious Options and
the Individual. Potsdamer Altertumswissenschaftliche Beiträge, 46. Stuttgart:
Franz Steiner Verlag, 2013. Pp. 177. ISBN 9783515106290. €48.00 (pb).
Reviewed by Max Nelson, University of Windsor (mnelson@uwindsor.ca)
In the last ten years there have been a number of collections of scholarship on ancient
divination.1 This new collection (the outcome of a conference held at Erfurt University in 2011)
sets itself apart by focusing on the links between ancient divination and individualization
(defined as “a process of change on the societal level”) and individuation (defined as “a
development on the personal level”), as explained by the editor Veit Rosenberger in the
introduction to the volume (pp. 7-8, at p. 7). The eight articles in the volume are meant to
illuminate the topic from various perspectives, with a focus on ancient Greek and Roman
sources.
Jörg Rüpke, in “New Perspectives on Ancient Divination” (pp. 9-19), discusses the co-existence
of institutional tradition and individual innovation and appropriation in the realm of divination.
Rüpke argues that in order to adapt to social realities, divinatory rituals were flexible, and
changes were often tolerated and even considered legitimate and necessary. This is shown from a
number of examples in Republican Rome, such as the tradition of obnuntiatio, in which a
magistrate could present his own observation and interpretation of a bad omen (p. 15).
Esther Eidinow, in “Oracular Consultation, Fate, and the Concept of the Individual” (pp. 21-39),
examines how stories of oracular divination showcase a particular conception of selfhood.
Eidinow contrasts two different conceptions, the subjective-individualist model and the
participant-objective model.2 In the first model, found in the modern West, the self is conceived
as coherent, integrated, and autonomous. In the second model, found in the Pacific Islands and (it
is suggested) in ancient Greek society, the self is conceived in relational terms as interdependent
upon and inseparable from other people as well as supernatural forces, including divinities and
Fate. Eidinow proposes that the latter model is evident in the way that oracles were consulted
and interpreted by ancient Greeks, which was not so much through an individual process of selfrealization, but rather through inquiry and deliberation which was collaborative, being shared
among people and between people and supernatural forces. This is exemplified in the collective
effort to understand the “wooden wall” oracle as recounted in Herodotus (7.140-144) (pp. 30-31)
and in the manner the question tablets from the oracle at Dodona refer to the consultant in the
third person (pp. 34-36).
Hugh Bowden, in “Seeking Certainty and Claiming Authority: The Consultation of Greek
Oracles from the Classical to the Roman Imperial Periods” (pp. 41-59), shows that while oracles
operated similarly in Greek and Roman times and attracted consultations concerning the same
sorts of issues, there were some fundamental changes regarding why people turned to oracles
rather than other means of divination. Bowden shows that during the classical and early

Hellenistic periods oracles were relied upon to provide certainty in unclear matters through their
divine authority (thus Bowden contests the common idea that they were used to sanction
decisions already made). While consultations were made both by individuals and by
communities, usually only consultations in the service of the state were recorded in stone
inscriptions. By the first century B.C. oracular consultations had declined in importance, as
epigraphic evidence attests, and this was explained by Strabo (17.1.43) as due to reliance instead
on the Sibylline oracles and Etruscan forms of divination. The support of emperors, such as
Augustus and Hadrian, revived the tradition of consultation at the old oracular centers (as is
particularly evident at Delphi, Didyma, and Klaros), though these came to be used quite
differently, reflecting the individualization characteristic of the times (thus Bowden challenges
the notion of the imperial decline of oracles advocated by Plutarch and others). Individuals took
up the initiative and the responsibilities of consultation, usually confident of the outcome rather
than dealing with a doubtful situation. More importantly, individuals usually erected inscriptions
about the consultations which were meant mainly for self-display, that is to advertise their own
personal piety as endorsed by divine authority. Thus, while classical Greeks tended to be anxious
to gain answers, later Romans were rather anxious to gain prestige.
Lisa Maurizio, in “Interpretative Strategies for Delphic Oracles and Kledons: Prophecy
Falsification and Individualism” (pp. 61-79), argues that a certain religious individualism existed
in the realm of Greek divination. She notes that both intentional prophetic utterances (such as an
oracle issued at Delphi) and unintentional ones (such as a kledon, an utterance taken to be
prophetic only by its hearer) were considered not only true in that they accurately (though
potentially ambiguously, for instance because of the use of metaphors) foretold the future but
were even thought to be the very cause of what was predicted. However, such utterances were
considered in need of interpretation and individual consultants or listeners were encouraged to
assume the authority to correctly understand the relevance and application of the utterance to
their own lives, requiring of them a certain amount of ingenuity and creativity, and to act upon it
(and fulfill it) appropriately, all the while guided by their own self-interests. Thus the
falsification of oracles was generally due to the response of clients and not a matter of fabrication
by diviners or fictionalization by authors like Herodotus, as scholars often state.
Susanne William Rasmussen, in “Cicero and the Pythia – a deceptive Dilemma?” (pp. 81-91),
discusses what many have considered Cicero’s dilemma, namely that while he did not have faith
he was obliged to participate in and promote religious rituals, for instance when elected augur in
53 B.C. Scholars in the past have either deemed Cicero a hypocrite or have believed that he
underwent a personal evolution over time through a conversion to philosophy. Rasmussen
however argues that the reality is more complex, showing that it made perfect sense at least to
Plutarch (Vit. Cic. 5.1) to contend that Cicero consulted the Pythia on his way back to Rome
from his philosophical education in Rhodes and Athens. Rasmussen argues that it was possible,
without dilemma or hypocrisy, for a Roman like Cicero to simultaneously live in two worlds—
—a necessary, public religio-political world and a personal, diversionary philosophical world—
since faith, feelings, and personal commitment were not part of religion. In the end she
convincingly shows that, when it came to religion and divination, it was difficult to disentangle
the individual from the societal.

Richard Gordon, in ““Will My Child Have a Big Nose?”: Uncertainty, Authority and Narrative
in Katarchic Astrology” (pp. 93-137), turns his attention to a neglected form of divination in the
longest contribution in the book. While ancient astrology has been intensely studied, the focus
has often been on genethliacal or natal astrology, based on creating a horoscope to determine a
person’s entire future. Gordon focuses instead on katarchic astrology, which was employed
mainly to help an individual decide upon whether to undertake a defined course of action or else
to answer a specific question. The origins of this type of divination are unclear but it seems to
have arisen among Greeks by the first century A.D., at which time Dorotheus of Sidon wrote a
poem describing its schemes, and it was later taken up by Arabs and Indians. Gordon provides a
very useful general introduction not only to the workings of astrology (which can be extremely
complicated), but also its growth in the rationalizing Hellenistic period. He shows that in practice
astrology was quite mutable to fit the demands of individual clients, who sought not so much
perfect predictions as usable (that is coherent and plausible) stories provided by a prestigious and
believable source in their quest to manage uncertainty.
Wolfgang Spickermann, in “Lucian of Samosata on Oracles, Magic and Superstition” (pp. 139151), shows that while Lucian did not deny divination outright, and in fact accepted the influence
of stars on people (if in fact De astrologia is correctly attributed to him), he attacked oracular
divination as playing on people’s fears and exploiting their gullibility. He further argues that, of
all divinatory and magical practices and beliefs, he particularly criticized the exotic and foreign,
such as the Egyptian oracle of Ammon which he considered fraudulent. This is the only
contribution without any overt mention of individualism, individualization, or individuation.
In the final contribution, “Individuation through Divination: The Hieroi Logoi of Aelius
Aristides” (pp. 153-173), Veit Rosenberger investigates the self-fashioning and self-display of
the second-century-A.D. Aelius Aristides in his work Sacred Tales, which he characterizes as
“an extensive personal (b)log about his relationship with a god” (p. 171). Rosenberger shows
how Aristides’s divinatory claim that he was be able to communicate with the gods made him
stand out, and how in particular he had a very personal and special relationship with Asclepius
with whom he was in contact through his dreams. Rosenberger also explores how Aristides
distinguished himself through a network of important individuals and as a respected and praised
orator and poet. The emphasis again is on how ancient divinatory practices allowed for variations
and innovations as they were appropriated by individuals for their own purposes.
The collection as a whole provides many different avenues of thinking about ancient divination
and the individual and its index (pp. 175-177) usefully allows for some exploration of particular
topics found in a number of the articles (which are not otherwise much cross-referenced).
Unfortunately, the proofreading for the volume could have been much more carefully done. Thus
letters of words are sometimes missing: e.g. “[a]ppropriation” (p. 10, n. 4), “I[l]iad” (p. 27, n. 40
[four times]), “Classical A[t]hens” (p. 37), “[l]ead” (p. 61, n. 1), “[T]aylor” (pp. 87 [three times]
and 88), “[W]eber” (p. 88), “[r]eligion” (p. 88 [three times]), “[m]agical” (p. 88), and
“[r]eligious” (pp. 88 and 144). Even entire words are sometimes left out: e.g. “only [one] more”
(p. 12), “compensated [for] by conceptualizing” (p. 14), “owing [to] his” (p. 142, n. 17), “tour
[d]’horizon” (p. 154), and “comments [upon] this remark”. Some bibliographical information is
omitted: e.g. entries for Craib 1992 and 2011 (p. 37), Foucault 1986 (p. 58), and Behr 1968 (p.
172). Some infelicities seemingly have arisen from translating from German to English. Thus the

usage of articles causes problems: e.g. “in form of a sickness” (p. 16), “propounding middle
position” (p. 140), “into the Hades” (p. 142) and “in the Hades” (p. 144), “marshes of [the]
Euphrates” (p. 144), and “leave a mark for the contemporaries” (p. 170). Some German has even
crept in: e.g. “Odyssee” (p. 147, n. 48). Finally, there are various other typographical errors: e.g.
“verseverse” (p. 61, n. 1), “quasi-hsitorical” (p. 62, n. 5), and “indi-viduals” (p. 87).
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